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COMMENTS
THE HARMS OF THE BENEFIT
CORPORATION
KENNAN EL KHATIB*
The benefit corporation cannot be ignored. To date, thirty states, including
Delaware and the District of Columbia, have enacted benefit corporation
legislation, signifying that the new legal status is here to stay. Largely established
to quell the fears of entrepreneurs pursuing social and environmental objectives
and profit, the benefit corporation appears to put an end to the legal uncertainty
linked to the consideration of other constituencies irrespective of whether such
consideration ultimately promotes shareholder value.
While many legal commentators have analyzed the initial impact and
advantages of the benefit corporation, few have explored the ability of the
existing traditional for-profit legal framework to accommodate for-profit,
mission-driven companies. This Comment argues that, due to the increasingly
accepted notion that profitability and the pursuit of social and environmental
impact are no longer mutually exclusive concepts, the traditional for-profit
framework permits social entrepreneurs to consider other constituencies in most
contexts and that social entrepreneurs can effectively circumvent the contexts that
bar such considerations when adequately counseled. This Comment also analyzes
the new corporate form's potential for abuse, suggesting that one of the core
impetuses for the creation of the benefit corporation-abating reenwashing-may
actually be exacerbated. While seemingly innocuous, the benefit corporation fosters
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Gilmore, my Note & Comment editor, and the entire staff of AULR for their
unwavering attention to detail.
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a harmful dichotomy with traditional for-profits that encourages consumers to
evaluate companies based on legal status instead of business practices.
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INTRODUCTION
The list of business associations is vast: the corporation, close
corporation, nonprofit, general partnership, limited partnership,
limited liability partnership, limited liability limited partnership,
limited liability company, and low-profit limited liability company,
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just to name a few. This list of corporate forms continues to expand,
with each offering a unique set of advantages based on the type of
business and its founders' objectives. The emergence of new
corporate forms gives credence to the saying "Necessity is the mother
of invention." The seemingly unmet needs of social entrepreneurs
served as the catalyst for the emergence of yet another corporate
form: the benefit corporation.'
The Model Benefit Corporation Legislation ("MBCL"), drafted by
William Clark and promulgated by the nonprofit B Lab,' seeks to
better protect directors' decisions that take into consideration other
constituencies as opposed to solely shareholder value.' Under the MLBCL,
benefit corporations are required to (1) have a corporate purpose to
create a material positive impact on society and the environment, (2)
consider non-shareholder constituencies along with the financial interests
of shareholders, and (3) assess their annual performance through the use
of third-party standards and benefit reports.'
In 2010, Maryland became the first state to adopt and pass benefit
corporation legislation.' As of October 2015, thirty states and the
District of Columbia have followed suit and successfully enacted
benefit corporation legislation.' In 2013, Delaware enacted a series
of statutory provisions that recognized the benefit corporation as a
corporate form.' While some proponents of the benefit corporation
1. See WILLIAM H. CLARK, JR. & LARRY VRANKA, WHITE PAPER: THE NEED AND
RATIONALE FOR THE BENEFIT CORPORATION 1, 2 (2013) [hereinafter WHITE PAPER],
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/Benefit%2Corporation%20
White%20Paper.pdf. The White Paper discusses the underlying rationales in
support of creating benefit corporations. Id. at 1. It also provides commentary to
the Model Benefit Corporation Legislation ("MBCL"). Id. at app. A.
2. BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., MBCL Legislation, http://benefitcorp.net/
attorneys/model-legislation.
3. BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., MBCL Legislation 1, 2 (June 24, 2014)
http://benefitcorp.net/sites/default/files/documents/ModelBenefitCorpLeegisla
tion.pdf; see WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 1 (claiming that the sustainable business
movement is constrained by an outdated legal framework).
4. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 2 (listing the major characteristics and
requirements of the benefit corporation).
5. Maryland First State in Union to Pass Benefit Corporation Legislation, CSRWIRE
(Apr. 14, 2010, 10:57 AM), http://www.csrwire.com/press-releases/29332-Maryland-
First-State-in-Union-to-Pass-Benefit-Corporation-Legislation.
6. State by State Status, BENEFIT CORP. INFO. CTR., http://benefitcorp.net/
policymakers/state-by-state-status (last visited Oct. 26, 2015) [hereinafter State by State
Status]. Additionally, as of September 2015, five more states have introduced benefit
corporation legislation. Id. (Alaska, Kentucky, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Oklahoma).
7. Governor Markell Signs Public Benefit Corporation Legislation,
NEws.DELAWARE.Gov (July 17, 2013), http://news.delaware.gov/2013/07/17/
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predict that Delaware's actions tipped the national scale in favor of
the benefit corporation by legitimizing the legal status of these
corporations, Delaware's modifications to the MBCL further
accentuate the weaknesses of the benefit corporation: the lack of an
effective enforcement mechanism and the potential for abuse.'
The current state of benefit corporation legislation has created
drastically varying models of the corporate form that potentially
promote "legalized 'greenwashing,"' the phenomenon that occurs
when marketers attract consumers by using terms like "green,"
"responsible," "sustainable," or "charitable" to describe their products
without substantiating any of their claims.' While the use of the
benefit corporation's legal status to verify the efficacy of social
enterprises attempts to ameliorate greenwashing by pairing green
consumers with companies that are required to use third-party
standards to verify their social and environmental impact, the
promulgation of the MBCL predates the establishment of an effective
enforcement and compliance program. As a direct consequence of
its untimely rollout, the implementation of the MBCL led to many
states enacting benefit corporation legislation that actually demands
little in terms of cost and action of its early adopters. The result is a
corporate form primed for abuse by pseudo-"social" entrepreneurs
looking to profit off consumers' and shareholders' misplaced trust in
the new legal status. In this sense, a very real public problem could
emerge. The benefit corporation's intended purpose of fostering
consumer reliance on legal status to verify whether a company is in
fact a genuine social enterprise creates a harmful dichotomy with
traditional for-profit companies, further exacerbating the problem.o
As a result, socially and environmentally conscious consumers may be
more likely to circumvent judging a corporation based on its business
governor-markell-signs-public-benefit-corporation-legislation (noting that, although benefit
corporations form under the traditional corporate structure, the benefit corporation's
certificate of incorporation must note the corporation's intended public benefits).
8. Today Marks a Tipping Point in the Evolution of Capitalism, BCORPORATION BLOG
(July 17, 2013), http://www.bcorporation.net/blog/today-marks-a-tipping-point-in-
the-evolution-of-capitalism (noting that Delaware's enactment of benefit corporation
legislation has created a clear path for social enterprise).
9. WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 2, 23-24.
10. See Mark A. Underberg, Benefit Corporations vs. "Regular" Corporations: A
Harmful Dichotomy, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GovERNANCE & FIN. REG. BLOC (May 13,
2012), http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/corpgov/2012/05/13/benefit-corporations-vs-
regular-corporations-a-harmful-dichotomy (discussing the potential harm to
traditional corporations arising from the creation of the benefit corporation).
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practices and instead rely on perceived "greenness" conferred by
organizing as a benefit corporation.
The success of the MBCL legislation in influencing state lawmakers
is partly the result of exploiting the uncertainty that exists in the
realm of social enterprises and the legality of considering other
constituencies in the ordinary course of business. This Comment
argues that the legal framework governing traditional for-profits
sufficiently accommodates social entrepreneurs' pursuit of social and
environmental objectives while insulating directors who use a triple
bottom line approach from liability for their considerations of those
interests." The advent of new research helps dispel the long-
standing belief that social enterprise and profitability are mutually
exclusive concepts, ultimately making it easier for judges and
investors to grasp the long-term benefits that accrue to shareholders
when directors consider non-financial interests. In addition to
articulating the suitability of the traditional for-profit legal framework
for social entrepreneurs, this Comment brings to light the benefit
corporation's potential for abuse. This Comment also explains why
the traditional for-profit remains the preferred corporate form for
putting social entrepreneurs' products and services at the disposal of
socially and environmentally conscious consumers while minimizing
the possibility of misleading consumers.
Part I of this Comment will provide a brief overview of the legal
history that ultimately gave rise to the benefit corporation. This Part
will also examine the major components of benefit corporation
legislation by differentiating between state statutes that closely follow
the MBCL and Delaware's Public Benefit Corporation Legislation.
Lastly, this part will disentangle the oft-confused "B-Corp"
certification process from the statutory benefit corporation. Part II
will assert that the current legal framework for traditional
corporations supports social enterprises' consideration of other
constituencies without requiring a change of legal status from a
traditional for-profit to a benefit corporation. Further, this Part will
demonstrate the connection between the benefit corporation and the
unintended, yet foreseeable, consequence of legalized greenwashing
and its paralyzing effect on consumer decision making. Part III will
conclude by explaining why, after weighing the advantages and
11. The triple bottom-line framework consists of maximizing (1) profit, (2)
social, and (3) environmental impact. See Alicia E. Plerhoples, Can an Old Dog Learn
New Tricks? Applying Traditional Corporate Law Principles to New Social Enterprise
Legislation, 13 TRANsAcTIONs: TENN.J. Bus. L. 221, 231, 233 n.65 (2012).
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disadvantages of the benefit corporation, the traditional for-profit form
remains the best corporate form for both social entrepreneurs and
green consumers. Finally, this Part will provide an example of a mission-
driven company succeeding as a traditional for-profit corporation.
I. THE ROAD TO THE BENEFIT CORPORATION
Before analyzing the benefit corporation as it currently exists, it is
important to examine the underlying rationale and motivation for its
emergence. Analyzing the emergence of the benefit corporation
requires understanding the legal framework in existence prior to the
establishment of the benefit corporation, surveying the legislative
efforts taken in an attempt to remedy perceived legal obstacles
impeding social entrepreneurs, and reviewing the MBCL drafters'
intent in creating the benefit corporation. This section will then
explore the requirements of the MBCL and compare and contrast
them with Delaware's benefit corporation legislation.
A. The Emergence of the Benefit Corporation As a Corporate Form
The need to appease social entrepreneurs who feared entering a
market that seemingly punished rather than rewarded directors who
considered non-financial interests spurred the creation of the benefit
corporation." The benefit corporation broke new ground by
expressly permitting, and even mandating, directors to consider
constituencies other than their shareholders and by providing
directors with the clarity and security to pursue non-shareholder
interests.'" Because a director's ability to consider non-shareholder
interests hinges on the level of scrutiny that the reviewing court
applies, the first step in determining social entrepreneurs' ability to
consider other constituencies under the for-profit legal framework
requires an analysis of the triggers and parameters of the two relevant
tests: the business judgment rule" and the enhanced business
12. E.g., Constance L. Hays, Ben & Jerry's to Unilever, with Attitude, N.Y. TIMES (Apr.
13, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/04/13/business/ben-jerry-s-to-unilever-
with-attitude.html?src=pm (quoting Terry Mollner, the founder of a socially
responsible mutual fund, in response to Ben &Jerry's sale to Unilever: "We think it's
horrible that a company has no choice but to sell to the highest bidder or get sued").
13. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 10 (emphasizing that the legal uncertainty
concerning directors' ability to consider non-financial interests under the existing
legal framework has made it difficult for directors to feel legally protected); see also
infra note 16 and accompanying text.
14. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 12-14; see also Mary Siegel, The Illusion of
Enhanced Review of Board Actions, 15 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 599, 605 (2013) ("The business
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judgment rule," the latter of which creates different obligations on
directors depending on the particular facts of the case.'
Additionally, examination of the evolution of the courts' treatment of
the shareholder primacy doctrine illustrates the doctrine's limited
application in the day-to-day decision making functions of social
enterprises. The following subsections will explore the landmark
decisions and doctrines that ultimately prompted the development of
the benefit corporation and the reactive measures that some state
legislatures took in an effort to sidestep these judicial determinations.
1. Board decisions and the varying levels ofjudicial scrutiny
Although there are six tests" Delaware" courts use when
adjudicating a board's business decisions, only three are relevant to
this discussion": the business judgment rule, the enhanced business
judgment rule serves to protect and promote the role of the board as the ultimate
manager of the corporation. Because courts are ill equipped to engage in post hoc
substantive review of business decisions, the business judgment rule 'operates to preclude a
court from imposing itself unreasonably on the business and affairs of a corporation."').
15. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 12-14; see also Siegel, supra note 14, at 609
(defining the enhanced business judgment rule as an intermediate standard of
review that requires a board of directors to prove good faith and reasonable
investigation during a corporate takeover).
16. Under the enhanced business judgment rule, this Comment is concerned
only with fact patterns giving rise to either Unocal or Revlon obligations on directors
because they are regarded as the most constraining on directors' flexibility in
decision making. See generally WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 11-14 (concluding that
under Unocal and Revlon, social entrepreneurs face constant legal uncertainty).
17. For a comprehensive overview of the six tests applied by Delaware courts, see
generally Siegel, supra note 14, at 602-16. The six tests are the business judgment
rule, the enhanced business judgment rule, Revlon, the entire fairness test, Blasius,
and the Schnelldoctrine. Id.
18. In recognition of Delaware's role as the leader in corporate law and as a
magnet for businesses of all sizes, this Comment bases its assertions and conclusions
only on the Delaware tests. This limitation in scope derives from the notion that if a
company and its board can successfully maneuver through the different tests in
Delaware, there are no remaining obstacles for social entrepreneurs in their choice
of where to incorporate. This Comment exclusively focuses on either circumventing
or passing the Delaware tests because Delaware is one of the only remaining states that
has not enacted a constituency statute. See infra note 72 and accompanying text (listing
the states that have enacted constituency statutes). In the event that a business seeks to
incorporate in a state that has enacted a constituency statute, the analysis ends there. See
infra notes 142-43 and accompanying text (explaining that the only substantial difference
between the discretion afforded to directors under a constituency statute and the
statutory benefit corporation is that the former generally permits, as opposed to
mandates, the consideration of other constituencies).
19. The tests of entire fairness, Blasius, and Schnell are tripped by reasons
unrelated to a board's pursuit of social or environmental objectives and, therefore,
2015] 157
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judgment rule, and the rule established in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews
& Forbes Holdings, Inc."0 The business judgment rule affords directors
the greatest deference in making business decisions.' The rule
provides directors with "a presumption that in making a business
decision [,] the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis,
in good faith[,] and in honest belief that the action taken was in the
best interests of the company."" The burden rests with the party
challenging the decision to establish facts that rebut the
presumption." Under the business judgment rule, directors can
consider non-shareholder interests as long as there is a rational
connection between that consideration and shareholder value.2 ' The
Delaware Supreme Court held that "[w]hen director decisions are
reviewed under the business judgment rule, th [e] [c] ourt will not
question rational judgments about how promoting non-stockholder
interests-be it through making a charitable contribution, paying
employees higher salaries and benefits, or more general norms like
promoting a particular corporate culture-ultimately promote
stockholder value."2 ' Accordingly, the business judgment rule will
will not be discussed further in this Comment. See generally Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983) (illustrating that entire fairness is typically the proper
test when dealing with conflict-of-interest cases); Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc.,
285 A.2d 437, 439-40 (Del. 1971) (permitting the court to invalidate a board's
determination without first attributing fault to the board's decision to address inequitable,
yet legally permissible actions); Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 668 (Del.
Ch. 1988) (noting that the Blasius test is tripped by a board's improper purpose).
20. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
21. See Siegel, supra note 14, at 605, 607-08 (illustrating that plaintiffs are rarely
able to prevail when the business judgment rule applies).
22. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984) (citing Kaplan v. Centex
Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971)), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244
(Del. 2000); Robinson v. Pittsburgh Oil Ref. Corp., 126 A. 46, 49 (Del. Ch. 1924).
23. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
24. eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33 (Del. Ch. 2010); see
also William H. Clark,Jr. & Elizabeth K Babson, How Benefit Corporations are Redefining
the Purpose of Business Corporations, 38 Wm. MITCHELL L. REv. 817, 835 (2012)
("[C]ourts reviewing decisions made in the day-to-day context will not question
rational judgments about how seemingly promoting non-shareholder interests (such
as a corporation's decision to make charitable contributions or to otherwise support
the community in which their operations are located) ultimately promote
shareholder value." (footnote omitted)).
25. eBay, 16 A.3d at 33. Moreover, Delaware's rationale for the business
judgment rule is premised on the realization by courts that in the inherently risky
environment of business, directors need to operate under a legal framework that
allows them to freely take risks rather than live in constant fear of lawsuits. DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2015); Gagliardi v. TriFoods Int'l, Inc., 683 A.2d 1049,
1052 (Del. Ch. 1996).
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protect the vast majority of directors' and executives' day-to-day
business decisions relating to the manufacturing, marketing, and
selling of their products; the corporation's investments and
charitable contributions; and any fair trade, employment, and
supplier issues, so long as the court deems them to be "rational.""
Other contexts limit a board's discretion in making business decisions.
One such context arises when a corporation employs defensive measures
to avoid a hostile takeover, triggering the enhanced business judgment
rule." In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,` the Supreme Court of
Delaware established a two-prong test to determine whether the
board acted properly in defending against a takeover attempt.29 The
first prong requires that directors "ha[ve] reasonable grounds for
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness
exist[s]."so The second prong requires that the defensive measure "be
reasonable in relation to the threat posed" to "come within the ambit of
the business judgment rule."" Under the Unocal test, the burden of proof
lies with the board.3 2 While the Unocal test represents the application of a
higher form of judicial scrutiny, in practice it is not difficult for
corporations to satisfy both prongs of the test.3
The Delaware Supreme Court similarly applies heightened scrutiny
to evaluate a target board's decisions in the hostile takeover context,
in which the posterity of the corporation is threatened." A board
26. See eBay, 16 A.3d at 36; Underberg, supra note 10, at 2 ("I am not aware of a
single case holding directors liable for a routine business decision because they
considered non-shareholder interests or that impose a general duty to maximize
profits and short-term shareholder value."). But see ClarkJr. & Babson, supra note 24,
at 834-36 (noting that some day-to-day decisions might lead to reduced shareholder
value but conceding that the contrary argument is just as likely).
27. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (noting
that a board of directors does not have absolute power to defeat a hostile takeover).
28. Id. at 946.
29. Id. at 955.
30. Id. While the court in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp. further refined
the first prong of the Unocal test by adding that the court must first hold that a defensive
measure is neither preclusive nor coercive before shifting the inquiry to determine
whether the measure lies within the "range of reasonableness" to pass the second prong
of the Unocal test, this refinement has no impact on the other-constituency analysis on
which this this Comment focuses. 651 A.2d 1361, 1387-88 (Del. 1995).
31. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
32. Id.
33. See Siegel, supra note 14, at 619-23 (noting that directors had a seventy-nine
percent success rate under Unocal with non-independent boards and an eighty-four
percent success rate with independent boards).
34. See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182,
184 (Del. 1986) (describing Pantry Pride's attempted hostile takeover of Revlon,
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assumes Revlon duties` "when a corporation undertakes a transaction
which will cause: (a) a change in corporate control; or (b) a break-
up of the corporate entity."" Once a company triggers Revlon,
directors may no longer consider other constituencies; the directors'
sole obligation shifts to seeking the best value reasonably available to
stockholders." In spite of this narrow objective, directors can still
utilize flexible means to pursue this mandate." Additionally, the
Delaware Supreme Court has since clarified that when applying
enhanced judicial scrutiny, a court should only be "deciding whether
the directors made a reasonable decision, not a perfect decision.""
Despite the differences in the contexts that give rise to heightened
scrutiny and in the breadth of each test, target corporations win the
vast majority of their cases under Revlon." Further, a director can
potentially avoid Revlon review by adopting a long-term strategy,
making the company's break-up or dissolution less likely."
which included the shifting of a board's obligations to shareholders from protecting
a company during the takeover attempt to seeking the best value reasonably available
to shareholders when it became apparent that the takeover was inevitable).
35. See id. at 182 (observing that the director's duty to protect the company can
change during a hostile takeover, requiring the directors to maximize the
corporation's value for the shareholders' benefit).
36. Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 48 (Del. 1994).
37. Id.
38. See Siegel, supra note 14, at 625 ("Delaware courts have sought to situate these
Revlon duties within the broader context of the directors' fiduciary duties, stressing
that once the board convinces the court that it has sought to maximize shareholder
value, the court will defer to the board's decision[.]" (emphasis added)).
39. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d at 45; see also id. (advising against the use of
hindsight determinations of the reasonableness of the board's selection); In re Del
Monte Foods Co. S'holders Litig., 25 A.3d 813, 830 (Del. Ch. 2011) (noting that the
test should consider the best available option at the time of the director's decision).
40. See Siegel, supra note 14, at 628-29 ("Of the thirty-nine cases that found a
corporation to be in Revlon mode, courts in thirty-one cases (or seventy-nine percent)
held that the boards had met their Revlon duties." (footnotes omitted)). Moreover,
as in Unocal, a board of directors operating with a majority of independent directors
is afforded greater deference in its efforts to seek the maximization of the company's
value at the time of sale. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176 n.3; see also Siegel, supra note 14, at
630-31 (noting that, of the target corporations that met their Revlon duties, seventy-
seven percent had boards with a majority of independent directors, but also finding
that their success did not hinge on having independent boards, as five of the eight
cases that failed Revlon had independent boards). However, the five cases where
companies with independent boards failed to meet their Revlon duties are alternatively
explained by (1) failing to get reliable market information, or (2) permitting corporate
management to pursue a bid that favors the management Id. at 630-32.
41. See Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150-51, 1154
(Del. 1989) ("Directors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived
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While triggering Revlon duties precludes directors from
considering other constituencies, both the enhanced business
judgment rule under Unocal and the deferential business judgment
rule permit directors to consider the impact of business decisions on
constituencies other than shareholders, including society and the
environment generally." For example, the Unocal court expressly
allowed directors to consider other constituencies such as creditors,
customers, employees, and even the broader community." The
Revlon court, however, narrowed the extent to which directors could
consider other constituencies under Unocal, holding that the
consideration of other constituencies requires "that there be some
rationally related benefit accruing to the stockholders."" However,
once a company's break-up or sale is inevitable, the duty of the board
of directors changes from preservation of the corporate entity to
maximization of the company's value at sale; conversely, if the
company's dissolution is not inevitable, then Revlon is inapplicable
and directors may consider other constituencies. 5
2. The shareholder primacy doctrine's limited applicability
The shareholder primacy doctrine applies to board decisions only
in limited scenarios. The court in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co." established
the seminal doctrine that courts and law professors continue to cite
nearly a century later.4 The doctrine simply states that a company
that elects to incorporate as a traditional for-profit serves primarily to
maximize profits for its stockholders." Directors retain discretion in
choosing the means to pursue that end, but the end itself can never
corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis to
sustain the corporate strategy.").
42. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176.
43. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
44. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 176.
45. Id. at 182; see supra note 41 and accompanying text (proposing one potential
method, the formation of a long-term corporate strategy, to avoid triggering Revlon mode).
46. 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919).
47. See Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 779-80 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968) (citing
Dodge as part of the final holding); Lynn A. Stout, Why We Should Stop Teaching Dodge
v. Ford, 3 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 163, 165 (2008) (confirming that courts cite Dodge to
establish a corporate director's authority to serve the shareholder's interest). But see
J. Haskell Murray, Choose Your Own Master: Social Enterprise, Certifications, and Benefit
Corporation Statutes, 2 AM. U. Bus. L. REv. 1, 10 (2012) (highlighting professors who
claim that cases like Dodge are rare).
48. See Dodge, 170 N.W. at 684 ("A business corporation is organized and carried
on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. The powers of the directors are to be
employed for that end.").
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aim to limit profits." Additionally, in Dodge, the court narrowly held
that a corporate policy that intentionally seeks to reduce profits is
invalid as a matter of law.o Thus, even given directors' wide latitude
in making business decisions, the court criticized Henry Ford's policy
that ostensibly aimed to make cars more affordable and to pay better
wages because Ford contrived the policy after determining that the
shareholders had made enough money-a decision that was not his
to make."' In this respect, the court concluded that Ford's refusal to pay
dividends was not the result of his discretion, but was wholly arbitrary in
light of the company's continued and ascertainable financial success."
Many commentators have since argued that Dodge's influence has waned
and that courts now readily accept that traditional for-profits can
regularly consider non-shareholder interests."
The court in eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark" echoed the
result in Dodge when it held craigslist's corporate policy invalid as a
matter of law, making it the only modern case since Dodge to fail the
first prong of the Unocal test." In eBay, craigslist founders and
controlling shareholders, James ('Jim") Buckmaster and Craig
Newmark, implemented a poison pill as a defense to a takeover
attempt by eBay." The court ultimately held that it was not the
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. See id. at 671, 683-84 (indicating that Henry Ford thought that the company
was making "too much money, [] had too large profits, and that, although large profits
might be still earned, a sharing of them with the public ... ought to be undertaken").
52. See id. at 683 (noting that it had been common practice to declare large
dividends under similar situations in the past).
53. See, e.g., Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits in the Public Interest, 80
N.Y.U. L. REv. 733, 773 (2005) (distinguishing the Michigan Supreme Court's
description of profit-seeking as the "primary," but not "exclusive" corporate goal);
Stout, supra note 47, at 165-67, 170-71 (arguing that the shareholder supremacy
doctrine first articulated in Dodge is outdated dicta from a state court that holds little
influence in the realm of corporate law). The particular factual background of the
case helps shed light on its holding: Henry Ford deliberately avoided issuing
dividends to keep profits out of the hands of his future competitor, the Dodge
brothers. See Stout, supra note 47, at 167; see also Nathan Oman, Corporations and
Autonomy Theories of Contract: A Critique of the New Lex Mercatoria, 83 DENV. U. L. REV.
101, 134-35 (2005) (arguing that the fiduciary relationship between a director and
the corporation "places few limits on managerial decision-making" and that Dodge
was decided on protecting the rights of dissenting shareholders from unreasonable
oppression, not unprofitable business decisions).
54. 16 A.3d 1 (Del. Ch. 2010).
55. See Siegel, supra note 14, at 619-20, 620 n.94 (confirming that eBay is the only
modern case to fail the first prong of Unocal).
56. See eBay, 16 A.3d at 20-21, 28 (defining "poison pill" as shareholders' rights
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poison pill that was unreasonable; rather, it was the core of craigslist's
corporate policy, which expressly aimed to not monetize its website, that
was invalid." Buckmaster and Newmark could have potentially avoided
the result in eBay by rejecting eBay's initial offer to purchase part of their
company for millions of dollars." Instead, Buckmaster and Newmark
accepted large sums of money and voluntarily ceded partial control of
their company to a party that objected to their corporate policy." The
eBay court bluntly stated that a for-profit corporation is not the correct
corporate form for pursuing purely philanthropic ends.'
Despite holding that the directors in both eBay and Dodge breached
their fiduciary duties by failing to maximize shareholder wealth, some
courts have limited the application of the shareholder primacy
doctrine."' A classic example of courts protecting directors seeking
not to maximize shareholder wealth can be found in Shlensky v.
Wrigley. In Shlensky, minority shareholders believed that offering
night games would make the Chicago Cubs a more profitable
baseball franchise." The directors, however, refused to install lights
to host night games because, according to the directors' assessments,
installing lights could result in a decline in the quality of life of
residents near Wrigley Field." The court ultimately ruled in favor of
the directors and went on to argue that the potential for decline in
the quality of life of residents could hurt property values in the
surrounding neighborhood, which would harm shareholders' long-
term economic interests. 5 Although Shlensky illustrates only one
example of courts' willingness to find-and even invent-long-run
rationalizations to restore discretion to directors in making business
decisions, 6 Delaware case law also supports this assertion. In Unocal,
plans that "fundamentally are defensive devices that, if used correctly, can enhance
stockholder value but, if used incorrectly, can entrench management and deter
value-maximizing bidders at the stockholders' expense").
57. Id. at 28-29, 34.
58. See id. at 10 (noting that eBay offered $15 million for a minority interest in
craigslist, which Buckmaster and Newmark rejected).
59. See id. at 11, 16 (noting that eBay aspired to monetize craigslist).
60. Id. at 34.
61. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954-55, 958 (Del. 1985)
(using the business judgment rule to uphold a director's decisions when made reasonably).
62. 237 N.E.2d 776 (Ill. App. Ct. 1968).
63. Id. at 777.
64. Id. at 778.
65. Id. at 780.
66. See Stout, supra note 47, at 170-71 (noting that "courts regularly allow
corporate directors to make business decisions that harm shareholders in order to
benefit other corporate constituencies" and that courts primarily shield directors
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the Delaware Supreme Court noted that the board had a
"fundamental duty and obligation to protect the corporate
enterprise, which includes stockholders[.]"6 ' This language, in
addition to the court expressly permitting directors to consider other
constituencies, supports the view that directors can consider other
constituencies without breaching fiduciary duties owed to
shareholders.' Thus, in Delaware, the shareholder primacy doctrine
only applies when board decisions trigger Revlon.69
3. The advent of constituency statutes
In addition to precedent that supports giving broad decision making
authority to directors who pursue legitimate corporate ends, many state
legislatures have cleared confusion pertaining to the shareholder
primacy doctrine by enacting constituency statutes." Constituency
statutes allow directors to consider the impact of business decisions on
constituencies other than shareholders, including the short- and
long-term interests of a corporation's employees, suppliers,
creditors, customers, local and national economies, and society
generally." So far, thirty-three states have enacted constituency
statutes, unequivocally permitting directors to make business
decisions in consideration of these other constituencies.7
from liability under the business judgment rule so long as there is some possible
future benefit, however unlikely, flowing to shareholders).
67. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985). The court's
mentioning that the corporate enterprise includes shareholders implies that there
are other constituencies a fiduciary may properly consider.
68. Id. at 955.
69. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
70. WHYTE PAPER, supra note 1, at 8-9.
71. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756(d) (2015) ("[D]irector[s] ... may
consider .. . the long-term as well as the short-term interests of the corporation ...
[and] the interests of the corporation's employees, customers, creditors and
suppliers...."); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 17 -16-8 3 0 (g) (v) (2015) (providing that directors
may consider "[a]ny other factors relevant to promoting or preserving public or
community interests"); see also IND. CODE. § 23-1-35-1 (f) (2015) ("Certain judicial
decisions in Delaware and other jurisdictions, which might otherwise be looked to
for guidance in interpreting Indiana corporate law, including decisions relating to
potential change of control transactions that impose a different or higher degree of
scrutiny on actions taken by directors in response to a proposed acquisition of
control of the corporation, are inconsistent with the proper application of the
businessjudgment rule under this article.").
72. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10-2702 (2015); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 33-756(d); FLA.
STAT. § 607.0830(3) (2015); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-2-202(b) (5) (2015); HAw. REv. STAT.
§ 414-221(a)-(b) (2015); IDAHO CODE § 30-1602 (2015); 805 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN.
5/8.85 (2015); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-1-35-1(d); IOWA CODE§ 490.1108A (2015); Ky.
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Noticeably missing from the list of states that have enacted
constituency statutes is Delaware." However, Delaware case law has
expressly addressed the ability of directors to consider interests beyond
shareholders' interests in certain contexts." In the case of routine
business decisions assessed under the deferential business judgment
rule, directors will have little difficulty in considering the impact a
business decision has on other constituencies." Even under heightened
review in the hostile takeover context, Delaware courts allow directors to
consider non-shareholder interests, provided the directors can point to
some rationally related benefit accruing to shareholders, and do not
require directors to abandon long-term corporate strategies in the
interest of increasing short-term shareholder value.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (West 2015); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1821(a)
(2015); ME. REv. STAT. tit. 13-C, § 832 (2015); MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & Ass'NS § 2-
104(b)(9) (LexisNexis 2015); MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 156B, § 65 (West 2015); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 302A.251(5) (2015); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-4-8.30(f) (2015); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 351.347(1) (2015); NEB. REv. STAT. § 21-2432(2) (2015); NEv. REV. STAT. §
78.138(4) (2015); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:6-1(2) (West 2015); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-11-
35(D) (2015); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw § 717(b) (McKinney 2015); N.D. CENT. CODE §
10-19.1-50(6) (2015); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (LexisNexis 2015); OR.
REv. STAT. § 60.357(5) (2015); 15 PA. CONs. STAT. § 1715(a)(1) (2015); 7 R.I. GEN.
LAws § 7-5.2-8(a) (2015); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 47-33-4 (2015); TENN. CODE ANN. §
48-103-204 (2015); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 11A, § 8.30(a) (2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-
727.1 (2015); Wis. STAT. § 180.0827 (2015); WYo. STAT. ANN. § 17-16-830(e).
73. See supra note 72 (listing the thirty-three states that have adopted
constituency statutes).
74. While there is no case law that discusses the consideration of other
constituencies in the day-to-day context where the business judgment rule would be
applied, its absence is quite telling. The courts would presumably apply the business
judgment rule because nothing will have invoked enhanced business judgment. See
infra note 75 and accompanying text (supporting the assertion that day-to-day decisions
will be scrutinized under the deferential business judgment rule). The court would likely
defer to the business judgment of the directors who are best suited to determine the
short- and long-term interests at stake concerning a particular decision. See id. Arguing
the contrary warrants the prediction that courts would face countless lawsuits challenging
the day-to-day decisions as opposed to the decision making process.
75. See Clark, Jr. & Babson, supra note 24 (explaining that day-to-day business
decisions that have the most social and environmental impact are afforded the
protection of the business judgment rule).
76. Paramount Commc'ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989);
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). Of course, if a
court makes a finding that the company's dissolution or break-up is inevitable, then
Revlon applies, and the consideration of other constituencies becomes ill-suited.
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 184 (Del. 1986).
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4. The fallacy that existing legal frameworks do not accommodate for-profit
mission-driven companies
The benefit corporation as a corporate form emerged primarily to
deal with social entrepreneurs' fears that the current legal framework
does not shield directors from liability in the pursuit of social and
environmental missions." William Clark, one of the leading
proponents of the benefit corporation who also helped draft the
MBCL, often cites Ben & Jerry's as the iconic example meriting the
creation of such a corporate form." Ben & Jerry's was sold to
Unilever instead of another investor, Terry Mollner, who had made
an earlier bid to take the company private. Ben Cohen, one of Ben
& Jerry's' founders, stated that he would have preferred to keep the
company private; however, the board felt obligated to accept the
higher offer to keep the company public.so Accordingly, benefit
corporation status offers a possible solution to social entrepreneurs
facing threats to the posterity of their corporate culture.8 ' This
remains one of the principal motivations underlying the formation of
the benefit corporation.82 Other rationales for the emergence of the
benefit corporation are summarized in the White Paper, which lists
market demand by consumers, investors, and social entrepreneurs
77. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 1, 10 (interpreting the lack of case law on
considering non-financial interests as indicative of courts' reluctance to adjudicate
these issues and their inclination to "fall back on shareholder primacy").
78. See id. at 6 ("These fears are exacerbated by cautionary tales of investor-led
board takeovers of private companies and stories like the iconic forced sale of Ben &
Jerry's to Unilever."); Kevin Ercoline, Note, Beyond Puffery: Providing Shareholder
Assurance of Societal Good Will in Crowdfunded Benefit Corporations, 64 AM. U. L. REv. 169,
174-77 (2014) (using the takeover of Ben &Jerry's as a case example to advocate for
alternative business entities); Clark Jr. & Babson, supra note 24, at 837-38 (citing to
the sale of Ben & Jerry's to Unilever as an indicator that the pre-benefit corporation
corporate framework does accommodate for social enterprises).
79. Clark Jr. & Babson, supra note 24, at 838.
80. See Hays, supra note 12 ("The plan to take Ben & Jerry's private came apart
when Dreyer's offered $38 a share in a stock swap. 'The board felt they had no
choice but to let all three groups put their best offers on the table yesterday,' Mr.
Mollner said, adding, '[w]e think it's horrible that a company has no choice but to
sell to the highest bidder or get sued.'").
81. See, e.g., Ercoline, supra note 78, at 177 (observing that the benefit
corporation is one business entity that helps "combat the possibility of forcing [a]
[b]oard of social enterprise [from] decid[ing] between the company's social ideals
and profit maximization in a takeover scenario").
82. See id. at 177-78 (using the takeover of Ben and Jerry's to exemplify social
entrepreneurs' concerns regarding threats to corporate culture that may be
alleviated by protections offered by benefit corporation status).
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and the prevention of greenwashing as the primary impetuses for the
creation of the benefit corporation. 3
Recent research suggests that sixty-eight million U.S. consumers
base their purchasing decisions on their sense of social and
environmental values." Additionally, approximately eighty-seven
percent of consumers indicated that they would switch to a socially
responsible brand where price and quality are equal.85 Some consumers
are willing to spend up to twenty percent more on green products and
services. These numbers illustrate that the current consumer market is
primed for socially and environmentally driven businesses.87
Correspondingly, for many of the same reasons listed above,
investors and entrepreneurs are tapping into the "green" consumer
market. In 2010, J.P. Morgan released a report that valued this
market opportunity at between $400 billion and $1 trillion, with
profits ranging from $183 billion to $667 billion.88 Additionally, theJ.P.
Morgan report noted that expected returns varied greatly, as some
investors expected returns "to outperform traditional investments.""
The report's executive summary concluded that investors and
entrepreneurs increasingly believe that they need not sacrifice financial
returns in exchange for social impact." When viewed holistically, the
market demand for socially and environmentally conscious companies
by consumers, investors, and entrepreneurs allows directors to derive
myriad rational benefits that accrue to shareholders by considering the
impact of the corporation's products and services on society, the
environment, and their balance sheets."
Lastly, the benefit corporation's emergence was intended to reduce
greenwashing."2  The drafters of the MBCL sought to use the
83. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 2-5 (examining and advocating for legislation
supporting benefit corporations as a method through which states, entrepreneurs, and the
public may all benefit by allowing corporations to consider public benefits).
84. Benefits of Becoming a Sustainable Business, Eco-oFFICIENCY, http://www.eco-
officiency.com/benefits-becoming-sustainablebusiness.html (last visited Oct. 26, 2015).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. NICK O'DONOHOE ET AL., J.P.MORGAN, IMPACT INVESTMENTS: AN EMERGING
ASSET CLASS 1, 6 (2010), http://ventureatlanta.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/
JP-Morgan-impact-investments-nov2010.pdf.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 7-8 (discussing possible benefits accrued from impact investments
that aim to improve the lives of vulnerable people, the environment at large, or
expand access to basic services for people in need).
92. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 2-3 (describing the problem of
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branding advantages conferred by electing benefit corporation status
to attract social entrepreneurs and to deter the practice of
greenwashing by imposing some barriers to entry, such as annual
reporting and third-party standard requirements." Further, the
White Paper suggests that requiring benefit corporations to list a
general public benefit may prevent abuse of the new corporate form
where benefit corporations (1) list an overly specific public benefit,
(2) consider that public benefit, and (3) render a decision that does
not comport with the spirit of the MBCL."
The White Paper goes on to refute theories that the benefit
corporation could devolve into a legalized form of greenwashing,
stating that "[a] company deciding to become a benefit corporation
will necessarily be legally required to meet higher standards of
corporate purpose, accountability and transparency.""
The goal of combating greenwashing thus greatly relies on the
effective use of third-party standards and annual reporting
requirements to serve as a method of substantiating benefit
corporations' claims of generating public benefit." These safeguards
are in place to ensure compliance with a company's general public
benefit and to provide management, directors, shareholders, and
judges with criteria to determine what constitutes an acceptable third-
party standard." Expenses incurred from hiring third parties to assess
overall social and environmental performance combined with those from
annual reporting requirements are intended to dissuade companies that
exclusively seek marketing and branding advantages from registering as
benefit corporations." The expectation is to reduce greenwashing by
"greenwashing," resulting from the overuse of socially responsible terms to lure
consumers into purchasing products).
93. See generally id. at 2-3, app. C, at 7-8 (identifying the problem of
greenwashing and distinguishing the MBCL from California's Flexible Purpose
Corporation ("FPC") in that the MBCL's use of annual reporting and third-party
standards promote real accountability).
94. See id. at 21-22 (providing an example of a company listing the benefit of
"keeping the river in back of the factory free from toxic effluents" and then
considering, yet dismissing, all other non-financial interests). This hypothetical also
raises the issue of measuring whether the board's ultimate decision "considered" the
public or general benefit.
95. Id. at 23-24.
96. See id. at 2-3, app. C, at 7-8 (using the combination of third-party standards and
annual reporting as a method through which consumers can check whether a
corporation that advertises as being socially responsible actually is socially responsible).
97. Id. at 25.
98. See id. (recognizing that, although benefit corporations under the MBCL are
not required to have their benefit reports certified or audited by a third party,
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pairing green consumers with companies that have in fact substantiated
their claims of social and environmental impact."
In sum, the complexity of Delaware case law, compounded by
Delaware's decision not to enact a constituency statute, created an air
of uncertainty that looms over social entrepreneurs. The emergence
of the benefit corporation represents one way to assuage these fears.
However, on closer review, Delaware case law leaves social
entrepreneurs with enough flexibility to pursue their social and
environmental objectives when adequately counseled.' 00 Armed with
new data and research illustrating the feasibility of both creating
social impact and generating profit, social entrepreneurs are in a
much better position to demonstrate how their business decisions,
policies, and corporate cultures ultimately increase shareholder
value.' In any event, state legislatures reacted to the White Paper
and the benefit corporation-a simple and immediate solution to
social entrepreneurs' problems-took the nation by storm.0 2
However, as is the case with any legislation predicated on model
legislation, the outcome produced an array of benefit corporations that
differ in substantial ways.' The resulting heterogeneity partly derives
from disagreement among state legislatures as to the most efficient ways
to enforce the public benefit mandate without deterring both social
entrepreneurs and investors from the corporate form.
"verification can and will become a means by which certain benefit corporations
distinguish themselves on a competitive basis to attract greater confidence in their
claims of environmental and social performance").
99. Id. at app. A, at 7.
100. See id. at 13 (explaining that some academic legal experts believe that the
absence of statutes or case law prohibiting companies from prioritizing social and
environmental benefits over maximizing shareholder value permits the pursuit of such
objectives). Contra eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v. Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33 (Del. Ch.
2010) (stating that "[p] romoting, protecting or pursuing non-stockholder considerations
[with defensive measures] must lead at some point to value for stockholders").
101. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text (valuating the "green"
consumer market opportunity at between $400 billion and $1 trillion, with profits
ranging from $183 billion to $667 billion).
102. State by State Status, supra note 6 (listing the states that adopted or proposed
benefit corporation legislation).
103. Cf PAUL H. ROBINSON & MARKUS DICK DUBBER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE
MODEL PENAL CODE 1, 5 (1999), https://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/
intromodpencode.pdf (reviewing the influence of the 1962 Model Penal Code on
thirty-four state criminal codes).
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B. The Current State of Benefit Corporations
As of October 2015, thirty states and the District of Columbia have
passed benefit corporation legislation, and an additional five states
have introduced such legislation." While many states have adopted
the core components of the MBCL, some states, most notably
Delaware, have passed legislation that greatly differs from the MBCL
and detracts from some of the key rationalizations in support of the
benefit corporation as a corporate form. 05
1. Model benefit corporation legislation
The major requirements of the MBCL can be summarized as
follows: (1) corporations must state a general public benefit and may also
include a specific public benefit;' 6o (2) election or termination of benefit
corporation status requires at least two-thirds affirmative shareholder
vote;' 7 (3) corporations must use a third-party standard to measure social
and environmental performance;"os (4) directors must consider their
decisions' impact on shareholders, employees, customers, the community
and society, the local and global environment, the short- and long-term
interests of the benefit corporation, and their decisions' ability to
accomplish general and specific public benefits;'0o (5) "benefit
enforcement proceedings" can be filed by the benefit corporation,
shareholders that hold at least two percent of the corporation's stock, a
director of the corporation, an owner that holds at least five percent of
the parent of a benefit corporation, or any other person listed in the
corporation's bylaws or charter;1 o and lastly, (6) benefit corporations
must publicly post an annual benefit report."'
The MBCL's explanatory comments provide that directors named
in benefit enforcement proceedings cannot be held monetarily liable
for their failure to pursue or create a general or specific public
benefit."' Additionally, the MBCL only mandates that benefit
104. State by State Status, supra note 6.
105. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(c) (2015) (eliminating a third-party
standard requirement for measuring public benefit).
106. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIs. §§ 102, 201(a)-(b) (2014) (defining a
"[g]eneral public benefit" as "[a] material positive impact on society and the
environment, taken as a whole, assessed against a third-party standard, from the
business and operations of a benefit corporation").
107. Id. §§ 104-05.
108. Id. § 102.
109. Id. § 301 (a) (1) (i)-(vii).
110. Id. §§ 102, 305(b).
111. Id. § 401(a).
112. Id. § 305(a); see also Brianna Cummings, Note, Benefit Corporations: How to
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corporation status be denoted in a corporation's articles of
incorporation but places no naming requirements (such as a suffix),
making it difficult for consumers to quickly distinguish benefit
corporations from traditional for-profits."'
2. Delaware's public benefit corporation legislation
On July 17, 2013, Delaware Governor Jack Markell signed Delaware
Public Benefit Corporation ("PBC") legislation, which became
effective on August 1, 2013."' Benefit corporation proponents
celebrated Delaware's adoption of the PBC due to Delaware's
reputation as the industry leader in corporate law."' While
Delaware's PBC legislation bears a strong resemblance to the MBCL,
it differs in five significant ways.""
First, PBCs are required to stipulate a specific public benefit in
their charters, which directly contradicts the MBCL's approach of
permitting benefit corporations to list a specific public benefit only
after listing a general public benefit."' Second, unlike the MBCL,
Enforce a Mandate to Promote the Public Interest, 112 COLUM. L. REv. 578, 593 (2012)
(concluding that benefit enforcement proceedings are an ineffective method of
increasing corporate accountability).
113. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 103.
114. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 8 and accompanying text (noting that some benefit
corporation advocates believe that Delaware's actions paved the way for benefit
corporations nationwide by legitimizing the legal status of the corporate form).
116. See generally J. Haskell Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation: Delaware's Public
Benefit Corporation Law, 4 HARV. Bus. L. REv. 345 (2014) (providing an in-depth
analysis of Delaware's Public Benefit Corporation ("PBC") legislation); Alicia E.
Plerhoples, Delaware Public Benefit Corporations 90 Days Out: Who's Opting In?, 14 U.C.
DAvIS Bus. L.J. 247 (2014) (analyzing the composition of the first Delaware Public
Benefit Corporations ("PBCs")).
117. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a)(1) (2015); MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§
102, 201 (a)-(b); see also Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 116, at 354
(observing that the specific public benefit requirement is the only area in which the
PBC is less flexible than the MBCL). An argument can be made that Delaware's PBC
legislation requires the pursuit of a general public benefit too. See DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 8, § 362(a) (stating that the statutory requirements are "intended to produce a
public benefit or public benefits [(specific public benefit)] and to operate in a
responsible and sustainable manner [(general public benefit)]" (emphasis added)). The
argument relies on the premise that because the statute already requires listing a
specific public benefit, "responsible and sustainable manner" indicates something
separate and more akin to the MBCL's general public benefit. Id.; see MODEL BENEFIT
CORP. LEGIS. § 102 (defining "general public benefit" as "[a] material positive impact
on society and the environment, taken as a whole, assessed against a third-party
standard, from the business and operations of a benefit corporation"). However, the
Delaware Legislature's decision not to simply replicate the language of the MBCL
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Delaware legislation does not require PBCs to use third-party
standards to assess compliance."' Third, Delaware's statute imposes
a balancing-of-interests test, without any guidance on how to apply
the test, in contrast to the MBCL's consideration-of-the-interests
test."' Fourth, PBCs need only issue a benefit report biennially and
only to shareholders as opposed to MBCL's requirement that the
report be released annually to the public. 20 Finally, Delaware's
iteration of the MBCL's benefit enforcement proceeding substantially
limits the class that can bring derivative suits to stockholders.''
Most recently, on June 24, 2015, Governor Markell signed Senate
Bill 75, which contained several amendments to Delaware's PBC
laws.' 2 2 The amendments became effective on August 1, 2015.12' The
Legislature removed the prior requirement that a PBC "include in its
name a specific 'public benefit corporation' identifier." 24 Instead,
the new amendment requires that a corporation, "prior to issuing
unissued shares of stock or disposing of treasure shares, provide
notice to any person to whom such stock is issued or who acquires
such treasury shares that it is a public benefit corporation."'12
Another amendment relaxes the voting percentages required to
makes any interpretation purely speculative.
118. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(c) (3); MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIs. § 102.
119. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (requiring that a public benefit
corporation balance "the stockholders' pecuniary interests, the best interests of those
materially affected by the corporation's conduct, and the public benefit or public benefits
identified in its certificate of incorporation"); MODEL BENEFrr CORP. LEGs. § 301(a)
(creating a broad consideration-of-interests test for benefit corporations to determine the
best interests of the corporation by considering the effect of any action on the shareholders,
employees, customers, general public, and community and societal factors).
120. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 366(b), (c) (2); MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. § 401.
121. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 367 ("Stockholders of a public benefit corporation
owning individually or collectively, as of the date of instituting such derivative suit, at
least [two percent] of the corporation's outstanding shares or, in the case of a
corporation with shares listed on a national securities exchange, the lesser of such
percentage or shares of at least $2,000,000 in market value, may maintain a derivative
lawsuit. .. ."); MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIs. § 305 (giving a right of action to the
benefit corporation, two-percent or greater owners in the benefit corporation,
directors, five-percent or greater owners in parent companies to which the benefit
corporation is a subsidiary, or anyone else "specified in the articles of incorporation
or bylaws of the benefit corporation").
122. Gregory P. Williams, Amendments to the DGCL, HARv. L. SCH. F. CORP.
GovERNANcE & FIN. REG. (June 30, 2015), http://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2015/06/30/
amendments-to-the-dgcl.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(c) (effective Aug. 1, 2015).
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approve charter amendments or transactions that convert a business
entity to a PBC from ninety to two-thirds.'"
Delaware's adoption of PBC legislation ostensibly marks a major
victory for the corporate social responsibility ("CSR") movement.
However, the initial reaction to these key differences has been mixed,
with some commentators encouraging Delaware to amend its statute
to more closely mimic the MBCL and others praising Delaware for its
more flexible approach.' In light of Delaware's most recent
amendments, there seems to be little effort to eliminate Delaware
PBCs' specific benefit requirement.'
3. Deciphering the labels: "Certified B Corp" vs. benefit corporation status
The terms "Certified B Corp" and "benefit corporation" are often
used interchangeably, yet both refer to two distinct entities. B Lab,
the nonprofit that promulgated benefit corporation legislation,
confers "B-Corp" certification on companies, while "benefit
corporation" is a legal status administered by the state.' 9 The two
differ in important ways: B-Corp certification requires that a
corporation achieve a verified minimum score on its third-party
assessment, while statutory benefit corporations are not required to
meet any benchmarks."'s Additionally, B Lab grants B Corps access
to services to help them with marketing, sales, and raising and saving
money.'"' Because B-Corp certification is available to both benefit
corporations and traditional for-profits, becoming B-Corp certified
represents one way for traditional for-profits to obtain marketing and
branding advantages without altering their legal status.
126. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 363(a), (c) (effective Aug. 1, 2015).
127. Compare Murray, Social Enterprise Innovation, supra note 116, at 350-51, 351
n.36 (quoting B Lab co-founder Jay Coen Gilbert expressing hope that Delaware
would eventually follow the MBCL more closely), with Plerhoples, supra note 116, at
253-57 (arguing that Delaware's PBC legislation is more flexible and, thus,
potentially better than the MBCL).
128. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 362(a) (2) (2015).
129. Benefit Corporation vs. Certified B Corp, B LAB, http://benefitcorp.net/what-
makes-benefit-corp-different/benefit-corp-vs-certified-b-corp (last visited Oct. 26,
2015); The Non-Profit Behind B Corps, B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/what-are-
b-corps/the-non-profit-behind-b-corps (last visited Oct. 26, 2015).
130. Benefit Corporation vs. Certified B Corp, supra note 129 (explaining that certified
B Corps are evaluated according to the B Impact Assessment, whereas benefit
corporations use the B Impact Assessment as a third-party standard for annual
reporting even though benefit corporations are not required to have their
performance verified or audited).
131. Id.
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II. THE HARMS OF THE BENEFIT CORPORATION
The momentum garnered in favor of social enterprise does little
more than indicate the market's readiness to accept that social
enterprise and profitability are no longer mutually exclusive
concepts. So long as social entrepreneurs genuinely believe that
social impact and profit can be sought in tandem and take
reasonable steps to actuate those beliefs, the traditional for-profit
remains a viable corporate form for the pursuit of those objectives.
Although it may seem that the adoption of the benefit corporation
as a separate legal status from traditional for-profits innocuously
provides social entrepreneurs with yet another corporate form from
which to choose, the creation of such an option advances a harmful
dichotomy that wrongly presumes benefit corporations' capability of
generating more social and environmental impact than traditional
for-profits.' The subsequent sections argue that not only does the
existing legal framework accommodate for-profit mission-driven
companies, but also that the creation of the benefit corporation
increases the potential for greenwashing.
A. The Traditional For-Profit is a Suitable Corporate Fonn for Social Enterprises
The theory that the benefit corporation emerged as a result of
legal necessity is misleading. Rather, it is the uncertainty of a court's
treatment of a modern social enterprise's ability to consider non-
shareholder interests that gave rise to the benefit corporation.'
Instead of wading through the murky waters, advocates of the benefit
corporation have preyed on the fears of social entrepreneurs to help
solidify the new corporate form. This section argues that the existing
traditional for-profit legal framework carves out enough space for
well-counseled social entrepreneurs to comfortably pursue their
socially and environmentally driven missions. Finally, this section
revisits the Ben & Jerry's example and argues that its founders could
have employed myriad tactics to sidestep Revlon altogether.
132. See Underberg, supra note 10 (arguing that the benefit corporation movement,
however well-intentioned, further propagates the notion that existing corporate forms
prevent directors from considering their decisions' impact on other constituencies).
133. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 7, 10, 12, 14 (explaining how courts'
treatment of modern social enterprises has resulted in uncertainty that has, in turn,
stymied the growth of social enterprise).
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1. Addressing the legality of social enterprises operating as traditional for-profits
The vast majority of business decisions that have the largest social
and environmental impact fall under the business judgment rule.'3 1
Day-to-day decisions and decisions concerning where and how
products are manufactured, marketed, and sold will be scrutinized
under this standard."' Because the market, investors, and courts have
recognized the financial value in pursuing social and environmental
objectives, directors will be able to more easily draw a rational connection
between the consideration of other constituencies and its impact on
shareholder value.13 As a result, social enterprises facing a challenge
to a board decision invoking the business judgment rule should be
able to demonstrate successfully that "the action taken was in the best
interests of the company."13 ' Facebook, Google, Whole Foods, the New
York Times, and Starbucks are all examples of companies that have
doggedly pursued social missions without legal challenge to their
corporate cultures.13 1 One common trait among these corporations is
that they all have achieved great financial success.' Thus, an
134. See Clark, Jr. & Babson, supra note 24, at 839 (categorizing judicial review of
director decision making into: (1) day-to-day decisions, (2) defensive decisions, and
(3) change of control decisions, conceding that the first category is subject to the
business judgment rule).
135. Id. at 835; see also Underberg, supra note 10 (noting that "directors have close
to a free hand when considering matters that are most likely to have broader social
and environmental implications").
136. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled by Brehm v.
Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000); Janet E. Kerr, Sustainability Meets Profitability: The
Convenient Truth of How the BusinessJudgment Rule Protects a Board's Decision to Engage in
Social Entrepreneurship, 29 CARDOZO L. REv. 623, 634 (2007) (arguing that "[s]ocial
entrepreneurship projects in the public sector can fulfill the social and financial
interests of publicly held corporations and their shareholders" and that director
decisions in pursuit of such projects are assessed under the business judgment rule);
supra notes 24, 44, 84-90 and accompanying text (drawing the connection between
the requirement of a rationally related benefit accruing to shareholders and the
pursuit and creation of social and environmental benefit); see also Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. CL 2751, 2771 (2014) ("While it is certainly true that a central
objective of for-profit corporations is to make money, modem corporate law does not
require for-profit corporations to pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and
many do not do so."). Hobby Lobby represents the first instance in which the U.S. Supreme
Court has expressly alluded to the benefit corporation. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2771.
137. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
138. See Anthony Page & Robert A. Katz, Socially Responsible Business: The Truth
About Ben and jeny's, STAN. Soc. INNOVATION REv. (2012), http://www.ssireview.org/
articles/entry/thejtruth about ben andjerrys (noting that these companies regularly
pursue social missions "with vigor," and that Google and Facebook have both "asserted that
providing services, rather than making a profit, was their top priority").
139. See id. (referring to the corporations as "successful," "promising," and
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assumption can be made that with profitability comes greater discretion
to jointly pursue financial and non-financial interests.'
Even in contexts in which directors are held to a higher level of
judicial scrutiny for their actions, directors still enjoy great discretion
in their ability to consider other constituencies. Outside of Delaware,
social entrepreneurs can choose to incorporate in states that have
constituency statutes.' The key difference between a constituency
statute and the MBCL is that the former permits directors to consider
the interests of other constituencies, while the latter mandates that
directors consider them."' This distinction is merely semantic given
that benefit corporation legislation has thus far found no tangible
way to determine whether a board of directors has actually
considered a particular constituency. 4 1 In Delaware, Unocal expressly
permits the consideration of other constituencies."4 While the White
Paper deceptively frames the Unocal test as a substantial check on
directors' discretion in making business decisions, the express
authority to consider other constituencies and the ease with which
business decisions pass judicial scrutiny under the business judgment
rule should allay social entrepreneurs' fears.'45
"prominent").
140. See id. (underscoring that financial success is critical to avoid legal challenges
and maintain control).
141. However, this Comment argues that even absent constituency statutes,
directors will be able to consider other constituencies along the same line of
reasoning that permits Delaware corporations to do so.
142. Compare 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1715(a) (West 2015) (using "may" in
describing how directors discharge their duties), with MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §
301 (a) (1) (2014) (using "shall" in describing a director's duty to consider the
interests of other constituencies).
143. See, e.g., Cummings, supra note 112, at 603-05 (describing the corporate
industry's reliance on quantitative data and the difficulty of quantifying social and
environmental benefit).
144. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petrol. Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985)
(permitting the consideration of creditors, customers, employees, and the
community at large).
145. Id.; see also WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 12-13 (failing to mention Unocal's
allowance of the consideration of other constituencies); Siegel, supra note 14, at 622
(finding that, as of 2013, boards had a seventy-nine percent success rate under the
Unocal test). Further, a board that pursues social objectives can increase its
likelihood of success under Unocal by employing a board of independent directors.
See Siegel, supra note 14, at 622-23 (noting that only four independent boards have
failed Unocao. The companies that had independent boards that failed Unocal did so
because their defensive tactics precluded shareholder voting rights, which is
irrelevant to the other-constituency analysis. See id. at 623.
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The express permission to consider other constituencies, coupled
with compelling data of companies' success under heightened review,
effectively results in the application of the deferential business
judgment rule."' Regardless, the White Paper incorrectly classifies
the benefit corporation's emergence as the only way for social
enterprises to avoid the result in eBay.' 7  In doing so, the White
Paper perpetuates the misconception that taking social and
environmental goals into consideration is the functional equivalent of
implementing policies that "openly eschew[] stockholder wealth
maximization."148 Rather, the primary lesson from eBay is that
craigslist indeed chose the wrong corporate form for its corporate
policy." Not actively seeking to attain profit while organized as a for-
profit corporation contravenes the fundamental principles of that
corporate form.' Relatedly, social entrepreneurs should note that
unless they sincerely believe-in addition to being able to offer
probative evidence-that they can achieve social or environmental
objectives and operate profitably, a for-profit corporate model is not the
proper corporate form.'' However, to use the result in eBay to frighten
social entrepreneurs who view profitability and social enterprise as
146. See supra notes 33, 40 and accompanying text (noting the overwhelming
success with which companies survive both the Unocal and Revlon tests). The statistics
demonstrating directors' abilities to meet their obligations under both the Unocal
and Revlon standards of review is of particular importance to the other-constituency
analysis because passing these tests causes courts to revert to the application of the
business judgment rule-the most deferential form of judicial review-giving
directors the best probability of avoiding an in-depth review of their socially and
environmentally driven business decisions. See eBay Domestic Holdings, Inc. v.
Newmark, 16 A.3d 1, 33 (Del. Ch. 2010) (stating that courts, under the business
judgment rule, will not question how seemingly rational business judgments affect
long-term shareholder value).
147. See eBay, 16 A.3d at 32, 34; WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 12-13 ("While the
facts of eBay are unique and a different company's publicly-oriented mission may be
considered a legitimate corporate policy, Chancellor Chandler's language suggests
that Delaware courts will seek to limit the 'purely philanthropic ends' of mission-
driven companies, especially when their directors' decisions are reviewed under
Unocals scrutiny."); supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (recognizing the
significance of eBay failing the first prong of the Unocal test).
148. eBay, 16 A.3d at 35.
149. Id. at 34.
150. See id. (affirming that a board owes a fiduciary duty to its stockholders to
"promote the value of the corporation" and finding that the corporate form was an
inappropriate platform to carry out purely philanthropic goals because stockholders
expected a return on their investments).
151. See Page & Katz, supra note 138 (arguing that "financial success is critical to
maintaining control" over social missions).
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increasingly converging ideas is misleading. In contrast to many other
corporate forms, the emergence of the benefit corporation relies on the
absence of litigation when considering other constituencies rather than
evolving from a line of cases that solidify the corporate form as an actual
solution to the rapidly growing CSR movement. '
Lastly, legal commentators have greatly exaggerated the impact of
decisions that trigger Revlon mode on directors' discretion to
consider other constituencies.' While the White Paper accurately
notes that other constituencies may not be considered once a
company triggers Revlon, there are certain strategies a company can
implement to avoid Revlon duties entirely.' The ability to avoid
152. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 13 ("There is a credible view among some
academic legal experts that because there is no specific provision in the Delaware
statute preventing consideration of other stakeholder interests, if a company were to
actually include the requirement of such consideration, including the possibility of
not maximizing shareholder value, in the purpose clause of its certificate of
incorporation or in defining the directors' fiduciary standards, such a requirement
might withstand the court's scrutiny in a defensive or change of control situation and
be given effect."). Despite making this concession, benefit corporation advocates
continue to focus on the absence of legal authority to further their movement. See id.
("In the absence of statutory authority or precedent and in light of decisions
including Revlon and eBay, the practical reality is that practitioners-general counsel
and outside counsel-are typically unwilling to recommend such a course of action
because the legal analysis is so unclear.").
153. See id. (noting that although skilled counsel can circumvent Revlon duties, it is
the "ambiguity about when Revlon duties are triggered" that contributes to widespread
fear (emphasis added)).
154. Id. One such strategy that allows companies to circumvent Revlon mode is
outlined in Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150-51, 1154
(Del. 1989) (holding that "[d]irectors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately
conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly
no basis to sustain the corporate strategy," and, finding such a plan, the court
applied the Unocal test instead of the Revlon rule). The strategy involves adopting a
long-term corporate plan that paints a clear picture that the company's dissolution
or break-up is not inevitable. Id. at 1150. But see eBay, 16 A.3d at 33 ("Time did not
hold that corporate culture, standing alone, is worthy of protection as an end in
itself. Promoting, protecting, or pursuing nonstockholder considerations must lead
at some point to value for stockholders." (footnote omitted)). So long as the
corporate policy does not resemble the policy in Dodge or eBay, social enterprises
should face little difficulty in avoiding the ominous shareholder primacy doctrine.
Id. at 35 (defining craigslist's corporate policy as one that "openly eschews
stockholder wealth maximization"); Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668, 684 (Mich.
1919) (defining Ford's corporate policy as one which sought "the reduction of profits" as
an end). Alternatively, a company can abstain from initiating an active bidding process.
See Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986).
Yet another strategy to retain control is through super-voting stock and contractual
arrangements with other shareholders. See Page & Katz, supra note 138 ("When Google
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triggering Revlon mode is best examined by revisiting the oft-cited
example of Ben & Jerry's.
2. Ben &Jerry's revisited: The bittersweet truth
The problem with citing Ben & Jerry's as the archetypal business
scenario demonstrating the need for the benefit corporation is that
the analysis often ignores founders' decisions and portrays them as
victims when, in actuality, they positioned the company to "sell to the
highest bidder or get sued.""' First, founders Ben Cohen and Jerry
Greenfield decided to take Ben & Jerry's public in 1984, which
introduced a contingent of outside shareholders whose interests the
company then had to consider.'5 6  Second, the board put Ben &
Jerry's in play when it began negotiating deals to take the company
private, representing another voluntary decision.15' Third, because
the founders never litigated the matter, the outcome of the case
cannot be accurately predicted. Accordingly, the argument that Ben
& Jerry's would not have succeeded at trial had it established a long-
term strategy that preserved a valid corporate culture and convinced
the courts that its dissolution was not inevitable cannot be
substantiated. 15' Rather, a court could have found that mere
consideration of selling Ben & Jerry's failed to trigger Revlon mode,
especially if the court concluded that the founders' decision to
oppose the transaction was valid in their capacity as shareholders
went public in 2004, for example, with super-voting stock for the insiders, the company
candidly admitted that public shareholders' voting rights would have little impact on the
company's direction. Facebook's 2012 initial public offering of stock allowed its founder,
Mark Zuckerberg, to retain control through a combination of super-voting stock and
contractual arrangements with other shareholders.").
155. See Hays, supra note 12 (discussing how a lack of options for Ben & Jerry's
prompted the board to take the company private).
156. Id. The director liability fears that largely gave rise to the benefit corporation
also underplay the reality that most social enterprises are closely held. Robert T.
Esposito & Shawn Pelsinger, The Supreme Court's First Brush with Social Enterprise, STAN.
Soc. INNOVATION REV. (July 21, 2014), http://www.ssireview.org/blog/entry/the-supreme
courtsjfirst brush with socialenterprise. The Delaware Code and MBCL provisions
that require a two-thirds affirmative shareholder vote to modify existing legal status before
becoming a benefit corporation contributes to the theory that the benefit corporation
form appeals mostly to closely held corporations or new social enterprises. DEL. CODE
ANN. tit 8, § 363(c) (2015); MODELBENEFTr CoRP. LEGIs. §§ 104-05 (2014). Such a vote is
less likely to pass in publicly traded companies with broad ownership.
157. Hays, supra note 12.
158. Id.; see Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1150-51 (affirming this method as a potential
strategy to avoid triggering Revlon).
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instead of as directors.'" Lastly, Ben & Jerry's' founders began
considering the sale of their company due to financial and
operational issues. " Although people close to Cohen and
Greenfield said "they were motivated by fear of litigation," provisions
in the company charter would have indemnified them.'"' Of course,
had Ben & Jerry's incorporated in a state with a constituency statute,
the outcome could have been more easily avoided. 162
Commentators citing the Ben & Jerry's example often correctly
determine that a reviewing court would have applied Revlon, but, in
highlighting such a conclusion, they neglect the sequence of events
leading to the triggering of Revlon.'" A well-advised corporation can
avoid Revlon altogether if it maintains its financial success, steers clear
of putting itself in play, or proactively implements a long-term
strategy to reduce the likelihood that a court would find its
dissolution or break-up inevitable.'" Moreover, the supposed forced
sale of Ben & Jerry's-which purportedly exemplifies the dangers of
pursuing social and environmental impact as a traditional for-profit-
159. Page & Katz, supra note 138 ("As shareholders, they were entitled to enjoy the
benefits of selfish ownership, which ironically in this context could have been
exercised altruistically to maintain the company's social mission.").
160. Id.
161. Id. Ben &Jerry's indemnification provision reads:
No director of the Corporation shall be personally liable to the corporation
or its stockholders for money damages for any action taken, solely as a
director, based on a failure to discharge his or her own duties in accordance
with Section 8.30 (entitled "General Standards for Directors") of the
Vermont Business Corporation Act, except for: (i) the amount of financial
benefit received by a director to which the director is not entitled; (ii) an
intentional or reckless infliction of harm on the Corporation or the
shareholders; (iii) a violation . . . [for unlawful distributions]; or (iv) an
intentional or reckless criminal act. The foregoing additional provisions shall
not be construed in any way so as to impose or create any duty or liability.
Ben & Jerry's Homemade, Inc., Quarterly Report (10-Q) (Aug. 7, 1995). The
consideration of other constituencies can be argued to place Cohen and Greenfield
in the second exemption, but it would likely be difficult to prove that their actions
not to sell to the highest bidder rose to the level of "intentional or reckless infliction
of harm." See id. But see Ercoline, supra note 78, at 176 (noting that even though
legal scholars debate whether the sale of Ben & Jerry's triggered Revlon mode,
"rejecting Unilever's offer would have likely resulted in several long and drawn out
legal battles . .. costing [Ben &Jerry's] millions in attorney's fees").
162. See, e.g., supra notes 71-72 (providing a list of state constituency statutes).
163. See, e.g., WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 13; Clark, Jr. & Babson, supra note
24, at 837-38.
164. See supra note 154 and accompanying text (detailing strategies corporations
can take to sidestep Revlon).
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ironically resulted in a positive outcome for a business facing financial
difficulties."' Unilever's winning bid could have also reflected the
company's valuation of both Ben & Jerry's and its ability to apply its
resources and management to turn the company around. 166
The fact that Cohen and Greenfield chose not to litigate the matter
substantially limits this fact-intensive case's relevance from lending
support to the argument in favor of benefit corporations. Without
adjudication, the example merely serves as proof that financial
success is critical to maintaining control of a company. Ultimately,
using the case to garner support for the benefit corporation and
misconstruing it to be an embodiment of the quintessential legal
issues faced by social enterprises is deceptive. 6 1
B. The Statutory Benefit Corporation Promotes Rather than Prevents
Greenwashing
Even if the benefit corporation were legally necessary, the current
rudimentary enforcement mechanism paired with the corporate
form's vast potential for misuse demands that lawmakers view this
corporate form with greater suspicion.' The precipitous rise of the
benefit corporation may, in part, be from its assumed effect of
reducing greenwashing within a market that is largely
unmonitored.'`9  In practice, however, there exists enormous
165. See Clark, Jr. & Babson, supra note 24, at 838 ("Although Ben & Jerry's
worked out a plan with Unilever to preserve many aspects of its corporate mission,
other mission-driven companies may not have the same bargaining power to protect
their own businesses." (footnote omitted)). While the founders of Ben &Jerry's felt
"forced" to sell, ironically Unilever's chief executive Paul Polman recently stated that
Unilever would seek B-Corp certification. Jo Confino, Will Unilever Become the World's
Largest Publicly Traded B Corp?, GUARDIAN (Jan. 23, 2015, 10:34 AM),
http://www.theguardian.com/sustainable-business/2015/jan/23/benefit-
corporations-bcorps-business-social-responsibility.
166. This point is made to illustrate that the winning bidder should not always be
painted as the villain. The winning bidder may actually be best option in assisting an
otherwise struggling company.
167. See Page & Katz, supra note 138 (discussing the various ways in which a court
could have decided Ben &Jerry's).
168. This Comment does not presume that corporations that have opted to
assume benefit corporation status are in fact ill-intentioned or that promoters of the
MBCL could have predicted the outcome of state-by-state legislation; rather, this
Comment attempts to shed light on the current framework's potential for abuse and
its unintended effect on the future of the CSR movement.
169. See WHrrE PAPER, supra note 1, at 22-24 (describing the importance of the
"general public benefit" purpose and holding benefit corporations to "higher
standards of corporate purpose" to prevent greenwashing).
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potential for these statutes to lead to legalized greenwashing. The
White Paper dismisses the observation that the benefit corporation
promotes legalized greenwashing because the MBCL requires
companies "to meet higher standards of corporate purpose,
accountability and transparency."7 0 However, the toothless benefit
enforcement proceeding in addition to Delaware not requiring the
use of a third-party standard cast doubt on the White Paper's
assertion."' In fact, Delaware's divergences from the MBCL permit
the exact legalized greenwashing that the MBCL sought to eradicate
because the PBC mandates that corporations include a specific public
benefit in their charters."' Thus, even though proponents of benefit
corporations view Delaware's enactment of PBC legislation as a step
in the right direction, it actually symbolizes a giant step backwards
with Delaware serving as the lodestar for legalized greenwashing.
Under the current Delaware PBC statutory provisions, a company
could hypothetically organize as a benefit corporation, choose not to
use a third-party standard to avoid costs, and yet still attain all of the
branding benefits related to the corporate status.' 3 As it currently
stands, neither the MBCL nor the PBC legislation contains a
mechanism to investigate exploitation of the corporate form."
170. Id. at 23-24.
171. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (criticizing the effectiveness of the
benefit corporation's enforcement mechanisms); see also supra Part I.B.2 (comparing
and contrasting Delaware's PBC legislation with the MBCL). Even outside of
Delaware, the vast list of third-party standards that companies can comb through
promotes "third-party shopping," the act of attaining certification by a third party
that caters to and specializes in a given company's industry. See generally How Do I Pick
a Third Party Standard?, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/third-party-
standards/list-of-standards (last visited Oct. 26, 2015). At first glance, the multitude
of third-party standards may seem preferable, but it also represents an overly
saturated market, which may cause third parties to gain reputations for their lax
assessments to generate more business.
172. See WHITE PAPER, supra note 1, at 21-22 ("The 'general public benefit'
purpose helps to prevent abuse of the legislation by corporations interested in
'greenwashing.' Without the general public benefit purpose, a corporation could
name a single, narrow 'specific public benefit' purpose (e.g., keeping the river in
back of the factory free from toxic effluents) and then 'consider' and dismiss all
other non-financial interests when making decisions. This would undermine one of
the main purposes of the legislation, namely the creation of a new corporate form
whose corporate purpose is to create benefit for society generally.").
173. See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text (noting the absence of third-
party requirements or enforcement proceedings in the Delaware PBC legislation).
174. See Cummings, supra note 112, at 591-92 (noting that "[u]nder existing law,
then, directors escape liability as long as they do 'not act with complete disregard to
the consequences of their decisions' and do not steal").
182 [Vol. 65:151
THE HARMS OF THE BENEFIT CORPORATION
Directors are not deterred from such misuse of the corporate form
because of MBCL's express exoneration of directors from liability for
failure to pursue or create public benefit"' and Delaware's blanket
protection of any board decisions provided they are "informed and
disinterested."' Even if a company with good intentions complies
with all of Delaware's statutory provisions, the difficulty in measuring
social impact makes any "score" subject to manipulation. 77
The B-Corp certification system that existed prior to the advent of
the statutory benefit corporation better served to hold companies
accountable to their claims of creating and providing social and
environmental benefit; B-Corp certification best serves this purpose
because only corporations that have employed third-party standards
and "passed" the assessment are able to advertise the certification.'7 8
As of October 2015, there are 822 registered B Corps nationwide, all
of which must meet B Lab's verified minimum score on the B Impact
Assessment. 7 1 Out of these 822 B Corps, only two are incorporated
in Delaware.s18  In contrast, as of October 2015, there are thirty-nine
benefit corporations registered in Delaware since the PBC legislation
took effect in August 2013, none of which are B-Corp certified.'"'
The fact that companies incorporated in Delaware are opting into
Delaware's PBC at an alarmingly higher rate than into B Lab's B-Corp
175. MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIs. § 305(a), (c) (2014).
176. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 8, § 365(b) (2015). Section 365(c) also permits PBCs to
include in their certificates of incorporation "a provision that any disinterested
failure to satisfy this section shall not ... constitute an act or omission not in good
faith, or a breach of the duty of loyalty." Id. § 365(c).
177. See Cummings, supra note 112, at 603 (underscoring the technical difficulties
in reliably obtaining and measuring social metrics).
178. See generally supra Part I.B.3.
179. Find a B Corp, B LAB, https://www.bcorporation.net/community/find-a-b-
corp?search=&field-industry=&field-city=&field-state=&field-country=United+States
(last visited Oct. 26, 2015); see Benefit Corporation vs. Certified B Corp, B LAB, supra note
129 (stating that a passing score is eighty out of 200 points). The full B Impact
Assessment, which purports to examine and measure a corporation's performance
against dozens of best practices on employee, community, and environmental
impact, takes approximately ninety minutes to complete. See B IMPACT ASSESSMENT,
http://bimpactassessment.net (last visited Oct. 26, 2015). A Quick Impact
Assessment can be measured in as little as twenty minutes. See id.
180. Find a B Corp, supra note 179.
181. Find a Benefit Corp, BENEFIT CORP., http://benefitcorp.net/businesses/find-a-
benefit-corp (last visited Oct. 26, 2015). It is unclear whether any of the thirty-nine
benefit corporations registered in Delaware are in the midst of completing or
seeking B-Corp certification or an alternative third-party standard. It is clear,
however, that neither of the two B Corps incorporated in Delaware has registered as
a PBC. Id. (illustrating that no PBC has obtained B-Corp certification).
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certification demonstrates that companies favor the legal status over
the certification. There are two explanations for this lopsidedness:
either (1) prior to the enactment of PBC legislation, directors did not
feel comfortable carrying out their fiduciary duties while in pursuit of
social and environmental objectives, or (2) PBC legislation has made
it possible for companies to reap the benefits of going green without
demanding much more in terms of cost, purpose, performance,
accountability, or transparency as opposed to the more costly, yet
demonstrative, B-Corp certification. Certainly, some combination of
both is entirely possible as well. One indicator that the second
explanation is the more likely of the two is that none of Delaware's
PBCs are certified.'12 In either case, if Delaware truly represents the
tipping point in the CSR and benefit corporation movement, then
the current framework of PBC legislation fails to provide consumers
with any real assurance that the companies they choose are actually
champions of corporate social responsibility.'
III. PROFIT AS THE PREFERRED MEDIUM FOR EFFECTING SOCIAL AND
ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE
One of the most important lessons from eBay and its aftermath is
that it is critical for social entrepreneurs to sincerely strive to produce
profitable returns while attempting to create social and
environmental impact.'18  The modern social entrepreneur is better
positioned now, more than ever, to make a compelling case that
profits and social and environmental objectives can be successfully
contemporaneously pursued.'18  The growing trend of legislatures
182. Id.
183. But seeJ. William Callison, Putting New Sheets on a Procrustean Bed: How Benefit
Corporations Address Fiduciary Duties, the Dangers Created, and Suggestions for Change, 2
AM. U. Bus. L. REv. 85, 113-14 (2012) (arguing that liberalizing the current benefit
corporation legislation to permit even greater flexibility is the way to prevent misuse
of the benefit corporation).
184. Justice Alito, writing for the majority in Hobby Lobby, stated, "In fact,
recognizing the inherent compatibility between establishing a for-profit corporation
and pursuing nonprofit goals, States have increasingly adopted laws formally
recognizing hybrid corporate forms." Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2751, 2771 (2014).
185. Perhaps one reason that social entrepreneurs choose for-profit business
associations is that profit provides a motivating force for innovation and efficiency
that is absent in the nonprofit setting. SeeJ. Gregory Dees & Beth Battle Anderson,
For-Profit Social Ventures, 2 INT'L J. ENTREPRENEURSHIP EDUC. 1, 5 (2003) (theorizing
that social entrepreneurs may choose for-profit corporate forms because they want to
"do well" and "[do] good" simultaneously and that profit can be channeled to
encourage efficiency and innovation).
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and courts accepting the notion that socially and environmentally
driven companies that consider other constituencies can do so
without harming shareholders reflects the reality that the benefit
corporation is unnecessary.' This increasingly accepted notion
recognizes that even if a board's decision marginally harms
shareholders in the short term, it may lead to the growth of
intangible benefits, such as goodwill and brand recognition, in the
long term; these intangible benefits, in turn, can theoretically cycle
back to increase shareholder value, representing a rational benefit
accruing to the shareholder.
A. Judging a Book by Its Cover: The Harmful Dichotomy Caused by
Encouraging Social Enterprises to Organize as Benefit Corporations
The benefit corporation does not peacefully coexist with
traditional for-profits. The creation of the benefit corporation has
created a false dichotomy between traditional corporations and
benefit corporations. Because there are only limited contexts in
Delaware when companies cannot consider the impact of business
decisions on a wide array of constituencies, the benefit corporation
fosters the illusion that benefit corporations are automatically more
socially and environmentally conscious than traditional corporations.`7
The benefit corporation's legal status brings marketing and
branding benefits intended to serve as a tool for consumers to
distinguish the "good" companies from the "bad."' 8 This dichotomy
increases the likelihood of consumers judging a company based on its
legal status instead of the merits of its business practices and product
and service considerations. The emergence of the benefit corporation,
without further safeguards and stricter enforcement," is not the
appropriate shortcut to pair socially and environmentally conscious
186. See NIcK O'DONOHOE ET AL., supra note 88, at 12, 14-15 (analogizing the risks of
impact investments to venture capital or high-yield debt investments and positing that
creating positive impact and generating financial return are two aims that can coexist).
187. See Underberg, supra note 10 (arguing that making a distinction between
benefit corporations and traditional corporations creates a "false dichotomy between
'good' and 'bad' companies" due to their choice of legal entity).
188. Id.; see FAQ, BENEFIT CoRP., http://benefitcorp.net/business/business-faqs
(last visited Oct. 26, 2015) (contrasting the socially driven mission of benefit
corporations with that of the profit-making goals of the traditional corporate form).
189. Potential solutions that this Comment does not further explore are: (1)
using the benefit enforcement proceeding as a tool to redirect corporate conduct to
achieve a general public benefit and (2) removing blanket monetary liability
protection for directors who grossly abuse the benefit corporation status.
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consumers with social enterprises. Traditional for-profits remain the
best way to balance raising capital`0 with decision making flexibility.
B. Social Enterprises Succeeding Under Existing Corporate Forns
TOMS Shoes ("TOMS") is a for-profit social enterprise
incorporated in Delaware and based in Los Angeles, California."'
TOMS chiefly became famous for its one-for-one policy, which states,
"With every product you purchase, TOMS will help a person in need."'"
In 2011, due to the success of its shoe line, TOMS expanded the one-for-
one model and launched TOMS Eyewear, which provides eye-care
services to a person in need with every eyeglass purchase.19 3
In August 2014, Bain Capital LLC agreed to acquire a fifty-percent
stake in TOMS, which, at that time, was valued at $625 million. 94
TOMS founder Blake Mycoskie, who had been the sole owner,
retained half of the company and will continue to be in charge. 19 5
The company has employed a business model that balances profit-
seeking ventures with the pursuit of social missions aimed at helping
people in need.'96 Mycoskie is no longer the sole owner and
continues to operate in a state without a constituency statute to
190. One advantage of the benefit corporation legal status is its ability to attract
"patient capital"; therefore a shareholder base is less likely to apply pressure for
short-term results. Underberg, supra note 10. A traditional for-profit social
enterprise should be able to attract the same shareholder base by listing clear
mission statements in their articles of incorporation and marketing itself as a double
or triple bottom line company. Traditional for-profits are also less likely to scare off
investors who would otherwise be put off by the benefit corporation's conferral of
blanket protections on directors.
191. TOMS Shoes, LLC COMPANIESNY.COM, http://www.companiesny.com/n/business/
toms-shoes-llc/4645815 (last visited Oct. 26, 2015); Where We Work, TOMS,
http://www.toms.com/jobs (last visited Oct. 26, 2015).
192. One for One, TOMS, http://www.toms.com/improving-lives (last visited Oct 26,2015).
193. Giving Sight, TOMS, http://www.toms.com/what-we-give-sight (last visited
Oct. 26, 2015). TOMS has since launched "Coffee by TOMS Roasting Co.," which
provides one week of clean water to a person in need for every bag of coffee a consumer
purchases. About Coffee by TOMS Roasting Co., TOMS, http://www.toms.com/coffee (last
visited Oct. 26, 2015).
194. Greg Roumeliotis & Olivia Oran, Exclusive: Bain Capital to Invest in Shoemaker
TOMS-Sources, REUTERS (Aug. 20, 2014, 2:16 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/
2014/08/20/us-toms-baincapital-idUSKBNOGKIZZ20140820.
195. Id. (reporting that, despite the deal, Mycoskie will "stay at the helm").
196. Giving Shoes, TOMS, http://www.toms.com/what-we-give-shoes (advertising
that "TOMS has given more than 45 million pairs of new shoes to children in need")
(last visited Oct. 26, 2015); Giving Sight, TOMS, http://www.toms.com/what-we-give-
sight (last visited Oct 26, 2015) (noting that TOMS has helped give over 325,000
people access to eye care).
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protect him in running a business model that considers the impact of
its business decisions on other constituencies; yet even with the
availability of PBC legislation in Delaware, TOMS chooses not to
organize as a benefit corporation.' 97 To date, there is no evidence
that TOMS has considered electing benefit corporation status;
nevertheless both the MBCL and Delaware's PBC legislation make it
extremely difficult to adopt the legal status.'" Amending the
certificate of incorporation becomes proportionately more difficult as
a company's shareholder base increases. Accordingly, benefit
corporation status is a viable option only for new social enterprises.
The TOMS CSR model provides an important lesson. At the
forefront, TOMS is a concrete example of a company exhibiting
financial success without compromising its corporate culture and
policy. TOMS also represents a social enterprise that organized as a
traditional for-profit and maintained its legal status despite the
emergence of the benefit corporation. Consumers have
unequivocally received TOMS's social message that the company
broadcasts through "cause-based marketing" and its "caring
capitalism" business model." Further, TOMS's business structure
provides additional lessons. While TOMS is a for-profit company, all
of its charitable practices are run through its nonprofit subsidiary
Friends of Toms.200 Although this Comment argues that the creation
of a nonprofit subsidiary is unnecessary to insulate directors in their
pursuit of social and environmental missions, social enterprises have
the option under the existing legal system to mimic TOMS's business
structure to best combine financial benefit with maximizing social
197. See Kyle Stock, Bain Capital Buys Toms, Will Still Give Away Shoes, BLOOMBERG
Bus. (Aug. 21, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-08-21/bain-
capital-buys-toms-the-625-million-do-gooder-shoe-company (quoting Bain's Ryan
Cotton on Mycoskie: "Blake found that for-profit and a bottom-line focus didn't
have to be in conflict with for-good"). Legislation similar to Delaware's PBC also
exists in California. See CAL. CORP. CODE § 2600-05 (2015).
198. See 80 Del. Laws c. 40, § 12 (2015) (to be codified at DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
363(a) (2015)) (requiring two-thirds affirmative vote by shareholders to become a
benefit corporation); MODEL BENEFIT CORP. LEGIS. §§ 104, 105 (2014) (same).
Notably, Delaware only recently amended its PBC laws in August 2015 to reduce the
affirmative vote from ninety percent to two-thirds. Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §
363(a) (2014), with 80 Del. Laws c. 40, § 12 (2015).
199. See Preeti Mehta, Capitalism's Moral Compass: The Argument for Cause-Based
Mad*eting, ANALYnc PARTNERs (Mar. 25, 2014), http://www.analyticpartners.com/
news-blog/2014/03/capitalism%E2%80%99s-moral-compass-the-argument-for-cause-based-
marketing/ (predicting that cause-based marketing will reach $1.84 billion in 2014).
200. Id.
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and environmental impact.20 ' The takeaway is that the existing
traditional for-profit legal framework provides all of the benefits of
social enterprise without introducing the slew of problems associated
with the fledgling benefit corporation.
CONCLUSION
The current legal framework, either through constituency statutes
or through Delaware case law, largely permits directors to consider
the impact of their decisions on constituencies other than
shareholders. The courts and markets are primed to recognize the
coexistence of social enterprises and profitability, making it
increasingly likely that courts will find a rational connection between
considering other constituencies and ultimately promoting
shareholder value. Many legal commentators and supporters of
benefit corporation legislation have utilized fears exacerbated by the
holdings in Revlon and eBay to help propel the benefit corporation
into the mainstream. Instead of relying on legal precedent, advocates
of the MBCL rely on the absence of case law to prove the point that
there is too much risk involved in pursuing social enterprise under
the current traditional for-profit legal framework. Perhaps the fear of
litigation has overwhelmingly deterred social entrepreneurs from
registering as traditional for-profits; but, until the matter is litigated,
the underpinnings of the benefit corporation remain based on mere
speculation, not law. In reality, jurisprudence on the matter clearly
recognizes that directors can consider other constituencies when making
business decisions and need only maximize shareholder value in certain
scenarios, all of which are avoidable in well-guided social enterprises.
The advantages of electing benefit corporation status are
substantially outweighed by the drawbacks of the existence of such a
corporate form. Not only does the emergence of the benefit
corporation create a harmful dichotomy between traditional
corporations and benefit corporations, but it also aggravates the very
issue the legal status attempts to eradicate: greenwashing. The
Delaware benefit corporation legislation's failure to include benefit
enforcement proceedings and its requirement that corporations list
specific public benefits in their charters directly contradicts the
aspirations of the benefit corporation drafters. Outside of Delaware,
states that have enacted legislation that closely resembles the MBCL
have still contributed to the legalized greenwashing issue due to the
201. Of course, the nonprofit subsidiary will also experience the added benefit of
tax-exempt status.
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inability of the MBCL's benefit enforcement proceedings to effectively
ensure compliance or ferret out exploitation of the corporate form.
While there are certain inherent advantages that benefit
corporation status provides-like raising "patient" capital along with
marketing and branding incentives-the traditional for-profit can
nearly, if not completely, achieve the same result through strategic
marketing. The traditional for-profit provides for greater flexibility
in decision making without potentially deterring investors who fear
that the statutory benefit corporation absolves directors of traditional
accountability. B-Corp certification, as opposed to the benefit
corporation's completely separate legal status, provides social enterprises
with marketing and branding benefits while eliminating the potential
for greenwashing by requiring that corporations meet certain
benchmarks, or at least expend resources, in an effort to achieve higher
standards of corporate purpose, accountability, and transparency.
Finally, there are examples of social enterprises maintaining their
traditional for-profit status even with the availability of the benefit
corporation, demonstrating the suitability of the traditional for-profit
for social enterprises. Although the underlying idea of the benefit
corporation is well-meaning, Delaware's departure from the MBCL's
language in key respects, in addition to the MBCL's creation of a lax
enforcement system possibly to promote widespread adoption,
detracts from the intentions of the drafters. Benefit corporation
legislation, as it currently exists, is nothing more than the result of
riding the wave of the corporate social responsibility movement.
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